Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID), a rapid growing technology for automated identification of objects and people, consists of three elements: a tag, a reader, and a database [1] . The reader accesses the information contained within the tag via radio transmission, and delivers the information to the database as an index, then the reader can retrieve the corresponding record from the database. There are three kinds of RFID tags: passive tags, semi-passive tags and active tags. In this paper, we focus on the passive tags due to their low cost and promising future. However, with no built-in power supply, it induces electricity by radio wave transmitted from the reader to send back the information kept inside. So, it comes with shorter transmission range.
EPCglobal class-1 generation-2 (Gen2 in brief) [2] was approved as international standard ISO18000-6C in July 2006. It is widely believed that Gen2 tags will be the mainstream during the developing of RFID applications. Since the limited computation and memory capacity, A Gen2 tag only supports Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) and simple Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC) computation, but cannot support conventional cryptographic functions, such as one-way hashing, symmetric encryption, or public key algorithms. That makes the designing of the security protocol for Gen2 become even more challenging.
In the past few years, researchers have proposed some authentication protocols for Gen2 [3] [4], but these solutions more or less exist the security problems. Chien and Chen (2007) [1] proposed a mutual authentication protocol conforming to Gen2. However, Due to the bad properties of the CRC function used in the protocol, it has serious problems. In this paper we will demonstrate the weaknesses of this protocol, and then we propose a new authentication protocol which can resist the problems existed in Chien and Chen's protocol.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the related works. Section 3 reviews Chien and Chen's scheme [1] and discusses their security weaknesses. Section 4 presents a new authentication scheme to resist these security pitfalls. Section 5 analyzes the security and evaluates its performance. Finally, Section 6 states the conclusions.
The key features of RFID systems include a lack of contact between the readers and the Tags. Moreover, the Tags have the ability of storage and processing. These properties mean that RFID tags have many possible applications. However, the technology also poses many threats to the user, some research papers have pointed out that RFID may be vulnerable to the threats as follows [1] 
Replay attack: The adversary could intercept the transmitted information between the tag and the reader, and then resend the information illegitimately to deceive a legitimate device and pass the authentication.
Denial of Service (DoS) attack: Some authentication protocols use the same key between the database and tag to perform the authentication process, once the information pass from the tag to the database, the database will query the records in the database to match the information. So, the attackers can intercept the transmitted information and cause the tag and the database unable to update their keys synchronously thus fails the following authentications and accesses.
Track Attack: The adversary could masquerade as the reader and send a special message to the tag, which causes the tag tracked down by the fixed value.
Forward secrecy: If the data kept in the tag is compromised by adversary later on, the tag's past communications can be identified and traced from the historical communication records.
Many RFID security mechanisms for location privacy protection have been proposed in recent years. By the method used, those mechanisms can be categorized into the following two types: pseudonym and shared secret update.
Pseudonym: The aim of this method is to prevent the tag from being traced. A series of pseudonyms are pre-shared by the database and the tag. For each tag reading, the tag sends a new pseudonym to the reader. However, this method needs large memory space to store the pseudonyms and the pseudonyms need to be updated when they are all used.
Shared secret update: At the end of each tag reading, the database and the tag update the shared secret synchronously. So, at each tag reading, the tag and the database share the different key. However, if the information transmitted through the air is intercepted, modified, lost, or replayed by the adversary, the database and the tag will be unable to update their shared secret synchronously.
Gen2 is one of the most important standards proposed by EPCglobal. Some companies like Philips and Texas Instruments have undergone the production of Gen2 RFID chips. Wal-Mart also has phased in Gen2 while phasing out Gen1 since 2006 [6] . However, restrained by its cost and resource, Gen2 is incapable of supporting complex operations like symmetric encryption, public encryption, and hash function. It only supports some simple operations. The supporting operations are as follows:
• PRNG : Pseudo Random Number Generator.
• CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Code): To produce checksum code to verify the integrity of the transmitted information.
• XOR : Exclusive OR.
Nowadays, many scholars have proposed a number of security solutions on the Gen2. Although Gen2 does not support traditional encryption algorithm, we still have the potential to improve their safety. Juel (2005) proposed a protocol which is free from being cloned and spoofed [13] , but it can not solve the eavesdropping and privacy issues.
Since the communication between the tag and reader is open and insecure, Karthikeyan and Nesterenko [14] had proposed a protocol using simple XOR and matrix operations to protect the information from being identified. Nevertheless, the transmitted information is vulnerable to tampering, which makes it suffer from DoS attacks, replay attacks and man-in-the-middle-attack. Duc et al [4] developed a simple authentication protocol by using CRC function, XOR operations and a random number to protect the information transmitted in the channel. However, if attackers can intercept the "End Session" at the final communication step, the backend server will not update the old key in its database. Therefore, the keys between database and tag are out of asynchronous which incurs DoS attacks. Furthermore, the adversary could intercept the transmitted information 1 M and 2 M , and XOR these two values to eliminate the protection of key i K that causes the failure of forward secrecy. Chien and Chen (2007) [1] then improved the scheme invented by Duc et al. [4] and Karthikeyan et al. [14] to provide stronger privacy and security properties. However, their scheme still has space for improvement in terms of performance efficiency and data security.
Security analysis of Chien and Chen's scheme

Review of Chien and Chen's protocol
In this section, we briefly review Chien and Chen's authentication scheme. The notations used in this paper are listed as follows:
EPC Electronic product code, each Tag has the unique EPC number.
DATA
The corresponding record for the tag kept in the database
The authentication key stored in the tag for the database to authenticate the tag at the
The access key stored in the tag for the tag to authenticate the database at the ( 3) Reader→Database: Together with N R generated in step 1, the reader forwards the received N T and M 1 to the database. 4) Database→Reader: Upon receiving the incoming authentication request, the database iteratively retrieves key values (K new , K old , P new , and P old ) from each tuple in backend server. Then, the database computes the I new =M 1 
If the database does not have to carry out a successful match, then give up the connection. 5) Reader→Tag: Reader retrieves DATA and forwards M 2 to Tag. The tag then performs a XOR operation on M 2 and its own P i , and verifies whether the M 2 ⊕P i and computed value CRC(EPC|| N T ) are identical or not. If both values are the same, the tag updates the record kept inside by replacing K i+1 with PRNG(K i ), P i+1 with PRNG(P i ) for next access.
Weaknesses of Chien and Chen's protocol
After studying Chien and Chen's authentication protocol, we have identified several weaknesses of their protocol. The major problem about Chien and Chen's protocol is the use of the CRC function. Due to their linearity, CRC functions have some properties that, from the security point of view, can label as bad. For a detailed description of the problem, we give a theorem and a corollary about the CRC function: Theorem 1. For any CRC (independent of its divider polynomial) and for any values a, b, c and d
Before we proof this theorem, we introduce the other properties about CRC function [17] .
While a and b represent arbitrary values and n is the bit-length of b . And then, we could proof the theorem.
Proof. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that n is the bit-length of a, b, c and d. On the one hand,
In particular, if in Equation (1) we have a = c, then:
According to the above theorem, we can say that Chien and Chen's protocol does not guarantee the non-impersonation of legitimate tags. In order to accomplish this attack, the attackers only need to listen to the information between the reader and the legitimate tag.
1) Reader → Tag : R N 2) Tag → Reader :
At this point, the attacker isolates the legitimate tag, so he has the following message: M 1 , N R , and N T , with this information, the adversary should be able to rebuild message when queried by the reader. Although the adversary does not know the secret information stored in the tag ( , , )
i i EPC K P , message M 1 ' could be easily calculate as described below. We know from the Corollary 1, we get:
So, message M 1 ' can be obtained easily by doing an XOR between M 1 ' and the even though he does not has the value of EPC. Therefore, the identity of a legitimate tag could be easily impersonated.
Although the author claims that the proposed protocol can resistance DoS attack, In case that if the message M 2 is intercepted, tampered or missing up to twice, the database will have no matching old authentication key and access key to complete the mutual authentication that incurs DoS attacks. For example, in the first round of the authentication, the authentication key and access key in the tag should be able to match the new authentication key and access key in the database just right. But if the message M 2 intercepted which leaves the tag unable to update the keys, at the second access, the authentication key and access key in the tag will just have to match the old authentication key and access key in the database. In this access if the message M 2 intercepted again, the tag will unable to update the keys keep inside for the second time. While at that moment, the old authentication key and access key in the database has been renewed. As a result the database possesses no matching keys to proceed with the authentication any longer.
In addition to the above presented security weaknesses, Chien and Chen's protocol does not guarantee the location privacy of the tags too. We assume that an adversary act as a reader to communicate with the tag, the tag will response the message 1 ( || || )
 to the reader, since the adversary does not know the keys of the tag, the adversary could not authentication with the Tag and the keys stored in the tag unchanged. At this point, the adversary could send another challenge to the tag, the tag will response a message
 again, at this moment, the attacker can verify if answers arise from the same tag by means of Equation (2):
Because the adversary knows the rand number N R , N R ', N T and N T ', the attacker will able to carry out track attack.
Our proposed protocol
In this section we introduce a new derived mutual authentication scheme to achieve RFID system requirements for data security and privacy protection. Our scheme is designed to accommodate the EPC Gen2 standard. As previous proposed schemes, we assume that the communication channels between the reader and the tag are insecurity while the communication channels between the readers and the backend server are secure. Due to the fact that, in practical applications, the reader usually has more computing power and the connection between the reader and database is often wired. So, we believe that this assumption is reasonable. There are two phases in the proposed protocol: System Initialization phase and Normal Authentication Operation phase.
System Initialization
The manufacturer generates random values for K 0 and P 0 respectively, and performs to store these various values in the tag's memory. We take K 0 and P 0 as the initial value of the secret information. And then the corresponding record in the database is 0 0 ( , )
Second-order headings
The authentication phase is depicted in Figure 2 . And the detailed steps of the authentication phase are described as follows. 1)Reader→Tag: The reader generates random number N R as a challenge and forwards it to the tag. On the Database side, if the value of variable x is old, it means that the Tag and the Database have lost synchronization, and the value of variable P i stored in the Tag is not update. Therefore, the Database side does not need to be updated the value of variable P i again in this scenario. We only need to use P old calculate M 2 and deliver it to the Tag. On the contrary, in Chien and Chen's scheme, regardless of the value of variable x is old or new, they all still do the following operations:
, , 
Performance and security analysis of proposed protocol
Due to the bad linear properties of the CRC functions, Chien and Chen's authentication protocol cannot achieve the security objectives they claimed. In this paper, we develop a new protocol which uses the PRNG function to instead of CRC function. The PRNG function which we used is generated by linear congruential method [2] . The following is the formula:
Where a, b, and N is the parameters of PRNG function, R 0 is the seed of this function. The PRNG-generated random sequence determined by the seed, that is, different random seeds will produce different sequences, while the same seed will produce two identical sequences. The pseudo-random number which generated by Gen2 RFID tags has the following properties [2] .
1) Probability of a single RN16: The probability that any RN16 drawn from the RNG has value RN16=j, for any j, shall be bounded by 0.8/216 < P (RN16 = j) < 1.25/216.
2) Probability of simultaneously identical sequences: For a Tag population of up to 10,000 Tags, the probability that any two or more Tags simultaneously generate the same sequence of RN16s shall be less than 0.1%, regardless of when the Tags are energized.
3) Probability of predicting an RN16: An RN16 drawn from a Tag's RNG shall not be predictable with a probability greater than 0.025% if the outcomes of prior draws from the RNG, performed under identical conditions, are known.
So we can take advantage of PRNG function in the RFID systems very well. The performance of the Tags and the Reader will be good too.
In the last part of this section, we will analyze the proposed mutual authentication scheme and compare it with previous works based on the following security criterions.
Data security
Data security in RFID systems tends to focus on the data secrecy of messages transmitting between tags and readers. In our proposed protocol data security is achieved by only transmitting bit-scrambled (XORed) or transformed (PRNG function generated) data message such as M 1 , D, and M 2 . So, the adversary could not to get the secret values kept in the tag or the database. Although N R is transmitted in plain text format, it is a random-generated one-timevalid number and performs meaningful computation to generate M 1 . Even though the number can be modified or eavesdropped, the security of the meaningful data M 1 and D will not be compromised, since the random number N T is not transmitted in the air ever.
Replay attack
When the tag and databases interact with each other, the random numbers N T and N R will being generated. These numbers are used to protect the transmitted information to keep from replay attacks, since the attackers do not know the value of the random numbers in advance. So, the attackers can not insert the old message in the new round of sessions.
Track attack
In each access, we use different random numbers N T and N R to compute the transmitted messages M 1 and D, so, the malicious attackers cannot easily trace a specific tag since there are no consistent clues revealed in each tag's response. Furthermore, we use PRNG function to instead of CRC function. The PRNG function has such good properties that the adversary can not to use M 1 and M 2 to calculate a fixed number to trace the tag any more.
DoS attack
In Chien and Chen's protocol, we could see that the database keeps the old values of tag's authentication key and access key (K old and P old ) just once then they are renewed. But in case that M 2 is intercepted, tampered or missing up to twice, the database will have no matching old authentication key and access key to complete the mutual authentication. In our scheme, we design a checking mechanism. If the matching record in the database is found by matching up by the old secret, which means an asynchronous update occurs. In this case, the values of (K old , P old , K new , and P new ) will be kept the same instead of being replaced by the new values. This is a design highlight of our scheme.
Forward security
In the proposed scheme, after each successful access, the keys kept in the tag will be updated using the PRNG function. The attacker could not use the key which is being used to recover the previous key. So even if the tag is compromised, there is no way to trace the past communications between the Tag and the Database.
Conclusion
The application of RFID has gradually merged into our everyday lives. As it gains on its popularity, security and privacy issues gain more and more concerns. Currently, Gen2 is the mostly applied new standard for passive tags. In this paper we have conducted a thorough analysis on the Gen2 conforming protocol proposed by Chien and Chen, and then present a new mutual authentication scheme for RFID systems. Our scheme improves the data security and privacy protection for RFID systems from the previous authentication schemes and is compatible with the Gen2 standard. Furthermore, our scheme can defend against the serious replay attack and DoS attack, at the same time the scheme provides excellent privacy protection such as anonymity and forward secrecy.
